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EMPIRES OF INTELLIGENCE

Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914

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INTRODUCTION

Exploring Intelligence and Empire

The Intelligence State

This book is about the process, aims, and results of government information gathering in the quasi-colonial states that spanned the North African Maghreb and the Middle East from the start of the First World War to the start of the Second. It is a study of intelligence gathering as a primary weapon of occupying powers. Overall, the book tries to answer a simple question: When colonial governments faced choices about the treatment of subject populations, how did they decide what to do? Political beliefs, racial assumptions, and the intellectual formation of those in positions of power all played their part. Monetary constraints and strategic factors were also influential. But so were uniquely local considerations: the expressed wishes of trusted local allies, the views of political and religious leaders, and the probable reaction of the wider indigenous community. The most salient factor of all, however, was the intelligence available to those in authority.

My aim then is to compare the information-collection practices and intelligence-assessment methods of the French and British imperial security services, placing them within the wider framework of imperial policymaking and administration. On the French side, the focus extends from the three Maghreb territories of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia to the Levant mandate of Syria. On the British side, security service activity is assessed in the mandates of Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan, and the linked territories of Egypt and Sudan. What follows is the first comparative study of colonial intelligence gathering in the early twentieth century, and a story with powerful resonance in an era of continuing foreign occupation of Middle Eastern territory.

In part, the chapters that follow explore the role of covert intelligence agencies in colonial policing and, more specifically, the containment of
early anticolonial nationalism. In part, they examine the role of specialist Arab affairs officers in French and British territories as pivotal links between indigenous urban elites, tribal communities, and migratory Bedouin on the one hand, and central administration on the other. As a whole, the book suggests a new model for the colonial states of the interwar Arab world as what may be termed intelligence states. A note of caution should be struck here. The label intelligence state is not meant to imply that intelligence and power were one and the same. As John Ferris, one of the first historians to integrate intelligence into the analysis of state policy, warns us: "Intelligence is not a form of power but a means to guide its use, whether as a combat multiplier, or by helping one to understand one's environment and options." It is this last aspect of intelligence as an aid to policy formation that was pivotal to the survival of colonial states.

Most operations of government were ultimately dependent on the quality of information received about the socioeconomic activity, customs, laws, and political attitudes of dependent populations denied basic rights and freedoms. With limited coercive means at their disposal, the French and British authorities from Morocco to Iraq relied on this broad array of incoming information to provide advance warning of any threats to imperial authority. Much of this data was routinely gathered in the course of day-to-day administration. To use a modern term, it was predominantly "open-source" intelligence, or "osint," and ranged from demographic and economic statistics to reports on village meetings, district court proceedings, and religious ceremonies. Its providers were just as likely to be regional colonial officials as specialist intelligence analysts. In many cases, they were one and the same.

Intelligence assessments were conditioned by the accumulated experiences of district officers, tax and education inspectors, regional governors, and central government administrators. But the world of colonial intelligence gathering was never an entirely European one. Much of the most prized intelligence about public behavior derived from locally recruited personnel who worked with security services in numerous ways as informants, interpreters, and covert operatives, or as soldiers and police deputies. We shall thus be dealing not only with open-source intelligence but also, to use another technical term, with "all-source intelligence," information of all types derived from both overt and covert sources. European officials inevitably relied on indigenous bureaucracies and established status groups to make sense of the cultural practices observed in colonial society. And, with the notable exception of Palestine, in the Middle East mandates the European powers built their administrative structures, fiscal regimes, and juridical regulations on the preexisting Ottoman regulatory system.

As Colin Newbury argues, the resulting interactions between Western officials, established elites, and indigenous appointees are better understood as a patron-client relationship than through the generic descriptor of indirect rule. To attribute the remarkably long lifespan of colonial systems to the selective delegation of limited authority to the most trusted members of established local elites is too reductive an explanation of colonial state governance in the particular circumstances of North Africa and the Middle East. Admittedly, imperial government in these regions survived because its senior representatives strove to reconcile their economic, strategic, and political requirements with the local interests of the dominant indigenous hierarchies. These shared interests might originate in land ownership, commerce, or some other common economic activity. They might be a combination of these and other, more cultural factors: family or clan lineage and religious attachment, for instance. What emerged might be described as a partnership of sorts between colonial rulers and established local elites. The colonial state formation that resulted was as much the product of the endogenous social hierarchy as of the exogenous decisions of imperial powers.

Such systems of political clientage could, and did, persist for decades. But they were rarely stable, not least because the patron-client relationship at their heart remained asymmetric. Imperial clientage was ultimately a system of rulers and the ruled rather than a genuinely collaborative partnership. Even the most trusted indigenous supporters of the colonial state sought greater political influence, enhanced status, or more privileged access to resources at the expense of their European rulers. In other words, even those who collaborated with the colonial state as its indigenous intermediaries—whether as ceremonial leaders, municipal governors, Muslim judges, or junior functionaries—were always likely to challenge a political system that confined them to an inferior position, thus eventually reversing the loss of status that accompanied the original imposition of European control. As a result, the patron-client model of colonial state authority was predisposed to generate political conflict because it was subject to renegotiation as the limits of what was politically possible and financially expedient for imperial authorities and their indigenous client elites changed over time.

To these discrete sources of political instability we must add other, deeper social changes that helped place intelligence assessment at the center of government. The pressures of population growth, urbanization, and proletarianization in the late nineteenth century also drove European states to take a closer interest in the family lives of their citizenry. The line between public hygiene and private behavior was increasingly blurred. Ideas of national efficiency and social Darwinism, positivist faith in technological progress, and growing official interest in the emerging social sciences encouraged governments to believe that the nation—and its colonies—could be improved through the judicious application of state power. Emile Durkheim's sociological theories were particularly popular among colonial officials. His benevolent view of bureaucratic surveillance as a logical
administrative response to the demands of government in structurally complex societies appealed to colonial service personnel eager to justify their work.

Seen in this light, state surveillance was an outgrowth of scientific modernism, not just an instrument of repressive control. Domestic arrangements, personal morality, and, above all, reproductive behavior were more explicitly linked to issues of social stability, public order, and policing. This connection also existed in colonial territories. Perhaps the strongest evidence of increasing state surveillance of domestic life was the official concern with mixed-race progeny born as a result of relationships between European men and local women in colonial societies (equivalent relationships involving European women remained rare). As Ann Stoler has argued, this signified the creation of new "racial frontiers" between rulers and ruled—frontiers that, like any other, had to be policed.

The need to penetrate indigenous society in order to monitor and control it returns us to the problem of consensual rule. Colonial states could never govern by popular consent because their foundations rested on concepts of a racial hierarchy at variance with genuine popular inclusion. Racial exclusion, and the assumptions of Western cultural superiority that underpinned it, introduced a violent and self-destructive dynamic to colonial empire. As Patrick Chabal points out, colonial systems of government could not put down secure foundations because they did not develop organically from within indigenous civil society.

Instead, the effort to coopt those elements of civil society willing to work within the colonial system remained a high priority for imperial administrators. Cost considerations were critical to the responses of colonial governments to preexisting institutions and hierarchies. On the one hand, it was economical to rule through indigenous political and judicial structures where possible. On the other hand, it was imperative that these institutions remain subordinate to colonial authority. This remained the case in those Muslim states where the European rulers scrupulously avoided all mention of the dread word *calony* and made extravagant claims of political pluralism, if not representative democracy. It was frequently asserted by French and British authorities alike that imperial governance respected the communal composition and ethnic differences of subject populations while binding them into a cohesive "national" polity; albeit one not yet fully fledged and capable of self-rule. Whether federal or unitary, this was colonial nation building at its rawest.

Yet it would be wrong to dismiss indigenous involvement in colonial government as merely the cooption of elites and the recruitment of junior auxiliaries by European officials. Neither could supplant the other. Nor were government and society entirely distinct from one another. Drawing on the work of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, analysts of state formation in the modern Middle East have suggested that the state may be understood as a political field in which competing interests—imperial governments, commercial elites, urban notables, tribal confederations, and political parties—sought influence and material concessions. Reviewing this literature in the context of tribal power in the Transjordan mandate, Yoav Alon describes the concept nicely. "If the state is to be understood as a framework or arena for political contest, a 'political field,' it is easier to grasp why tribes can cooperate with this political arrangement. Acts of resistance, as occurred in many tribal societies . . ., can be understood in the light of this principle, as an attempt not to overthrow the state, but to influence it and compete for resources from the central government." 19

There are limits to this model of imperial pluralism. No matter what the elaborate administrative structures of shared authority between imperial rulers and ostensibly sovereign indigenous administrations, interest groups, or ethnic communities, only Ibn Saud's Saudi Arabia developed beyond European colonial, or neocolonial, control. The limited life expectancy and international scrutiny inherent in the mandate concept certainly imposed limits on the extent of British or French political domination and economic exploitation of the states in question. But, like the protectorate system, mandate governance was closer to colonialism than to a genuine power-sharing arrangement between European advisers and indigenous authorities. The Moroccan sultan's *makhzen* administration, its Tunisian beylical counterpart, the Egyptian monarchy, the Hashemite regimes of Iraq and Transjordan, and the emirates of the Persian Gulf, even the thousands of junior administrators—or *effendiyya*—across the Middle East, were all manipulated by the French and British authorities in situ.

Where do the security services fit into these administrative structures of imperial clientele? The answer is threefold. First, the native affairs services in rural areas and the police agencies of urban districts stood at the interface between European imperial authority and indigenous elite opinion. In several of the territories studied here, it typically fell to military intelligence officers and policemen to report the preliminary indications of a collapse in the patron-client relationships on which local government administration was based. Second, intelligence providers, whether dedicated security service personnel, indigenous informants, or civil administrators, advised imperial government of the day-to-day workings of the clientele system. Their reports on the constant cycle of competition for influence, resources, and power between an alien administration and its indigenous auxiliaries were integral to the capacity of the colonial state either to forestall violent conflict or to suppress it quickly. Third, the security services were also adjuncts of the apparatus of imperial policing. Intelligence of organized dissent—furnished by *Sturte* personnel in Morocco or Algeria, by British political officers in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, or by special service officers in
the southern desert of Transjordan and Iraq—was the first stage in the process of force redeployment and repression. Security services were the colonial state's early warning system. If they failed to predict unrest or, if their intelligence of it was ignored, the resultant "warning failures" imperilled colonial authority.23

The security services also played a more active role than merely gathering, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence within the state apparatus—the classic "intelligence cycle."24 They strove to control political participation, sometimes using their powers of arrest and detention for the purpose. They regulated public political conduct by enforcing restrictions on freedom of association or prohibitions on political or trade union organization. And they manipulated the local political process by covert surveillance and coercive intervention when the colonial order appeared to be under threat.25

In practice, colonial security services struggled to separate their roles as intelligence providers and agencies of state violence. Often, they conflated the two. Aside from the ethics of such behavior, the use of intelligence as the basis for repressive measures against individuals or entire communities, whether conducted within legal parameters or not, inevitably compromised the effectiveness of future intelligence gathering by alienating the targets of this repression. Hannah Arendt's well-known theories about the state's use of political violence to achieve purely instrumental goals suggested that such violence was typically employed by regimes fearful of losing their grip on power.26 As Jock McCulloch has noted, the absence of consentual authority in colonial states necessarily placed state violence at the very heart of colonial systems of social control.27 Jim House and Neil MacMaster have shown in the context of French police killings of Algerian nationalists in 1961 that one logical, if appalling, endpoint of this repressive colonialism could be the descent into "state terror." There was always a risk that security force intelligence might be exploited by unscrupulous officials, not just to contain anticolonial opposition, but to eliminate those identified as opponents of the state.28 The point is that colonial intelligence providers operated in political environments where arbitrary and sometimes extreme violence by policemen, soldiers, company foremen, farm overseers, and native auxiliaries was habitual. Time and again, it fell to colonial security services to perform a dual role here, both preempting the application of such violence by early intelligence warnings, and recommending the use of coercive force when intelligence indicated imminent dissent. It was a tall order.

The metropolitan reaction to the shooting of hundreds of Indian civilians by British imperial troops at Amritsar in April 1919 suggested that, during the interwar period, press and public opinion in Britain—and France as well—would question wholesale killings of dependent populations on a scale comparable to the initial phases of colonial occupation in the previous century.29 The fact that Middle East mandates were subject to a form of

international scrutiny through the League of Nations mandate commission acted as a further constraint on the use of state violence to maintain order. As Gil Merom argues, the greater the capacity for the democratic expression of opposition to brutal methods of external political control in dependent societies, the less feasible it becomes for colonial states to employ unlimited force to uphold their power. Merom frames his argument in terms of a "normative gap" between the expectations of educated opinion and the capacity of a colonial state to employ unlimited violence against a subject population.30 Put crudely, the use of unrestricted state violence against colonial civilians was increasingly intolerable to domestic opinion in Britain and France. Greater restraint was called for. In these changed circumstances, intelligence agencies had to ensure that force was targeted efficiently, either to prevent the outbreak of more widespread violence or to ensure that order was restored as quickly as possible.

Intelligence and the Colonial State

Military historians describe intelligence effectively used as a force multiplier. Information about enemy dispositions, imminent threats, or potential subversion may add substantially to the capacity of states, armies, or police forces to achieve their desired results in policy, battle, or the maintenance of order.31 Historians of empire have not tended to view in comparable terms the information acquired by colonial states about dependent populations.

One reason for this may be that, as we have seen, constitutionally and conceptually, colonial states occupied a shifting middle ground between domestic and foreign, between statehood and dependence on an external power. There was inherent organizational tension between colonies without recognized national status as subordinate components of an imperial system and the European nation-states at the heart of that system. Furthermore, colonial governments struggled to transcend their origins as occupation administrations. A territorial presence was but the necessary prelude to the cultural, legal, and social transformations that signified the imposition of meaningful political control.32

The murky status of the colonial state was clouded still further by four additional factors. First, colonial states, although confined by their relationship to the metropolitan imperial power, retained some autonomy as political actors. Second, the modern international system may have recognized colonial territory as British or French (or elsewhere Belgian, Dutch, Portuguese, American, or Japanese), but the vast majority of colonial populations were assuredly "foreign" in terms of ethnicity, culture, and political allegiance. This raises the third problem. Colonial states were not bound together by the common interest of the general population and the central authority that governed them. Indeed, the growth of national political com-
Investigating Intelligence and Empire

The chapters that follow examine various aspects of this intelligence power in the colonial states of the Arab world after 1914. Chapter 1 traces the nature and development of intelligence gathering and security policing in imperial territories across the Arab world between the two world wars. It explores the connections between senior imperial administrators and their imperial security services, suggesting that the providers of political intelligence quickly established themselves as a bridge between government and subject populations. Put simply, imperial administration could not function without the security services and, in tribal society especially, intelligence officers were the most familiar face of central government. The chapter dwells on the social background, the training, and the field experience of security agency personnel, both military and civilian. It argues that in each of the territories studied, homogenous intelligence communities existed, bound together by common problems, shared practice, and, in certain cases, a growing opposition to European settlement, capitalist enterprise, and the sectarian interests of the indigenous urban commercial elite.

Chapter 2 examines the role of past precedent in shaping the "official mind" of imperial security services in Muslim societies. Constant reference to earlier experience shaped the perception of early Arab nationalism—whether secular and leftist or Islamic and traditional—as inherently destructive of colonial order and elite authority. The incompatibility of Arab nationalism and colonialism is obvious. But the effect of security service reading of the Arab nationalist threat on the development of French and British colonial states has not been examined through the eyes of the intelligence officials involved.

The second chapter also investigates the movement of security agency personnel within the French and British imperial systems, focusing, in particular, on the adaptation of administrative practice from older colonies to the Middle East mandates after the First World War. In this chapter, I suggest that the development of the North African and Middle East territories into intelligence states after 1919 owed much to prevailing ideas of governance, popular control, and racial hierarchy among officials and Arabist specialists charged with the imposition of colonial order. Four past precedents of key significance are examined in some detail, two from the British Empire and two from the French. In the British case, there are the "lessons" of policing the North-West Frontier in British India, and the role of the Sudan Political Service in the containment of intercommunal rivalry in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Britain's imperial intelligence specialists made much of the accumulated experience of policing and counterinsurgency in the Indian subcontinent and, more recently, Ireland. Britain's long-standing tradition of collaboration with Muslim princely states in India, Malaya, and Arabia, and its wartime support for Sherif al-Husayn's revolt against Ottoman suzerainty also played a central role in shaping the attitudes of intelligence practitioners toward the differing forms of indigenous opposition they encountered in the Arab world. In the French case, the Algerian government and the North African Residencies, as well as the native affairs specialists and military commanders stationed in the Maghreb and the
Levant, took pride in their anthropological approach to understanding Muslim societies in contrast to the crude mercantilism of their British rivals. The experience of the bureaux arabes in early colonial Algeria, and the success of the "Lyantey method" of pacification and indirect rule in the Moroccan protectorate are investigated by reference to their subsequent application in mandatory Syria.

Chapter 3 focuses on France’s Muslim territories to investigate security responses to differing forms of indigenous opposition. It focuses, in particular, on two distinct sources of anticolonial thought: pan-Islamist teachings and Communist ideology. The threat perceptions of the French intelligence communities in the Maghreb and the Levant indicate a profound mistrust of Islamic engagement in colonial politics and a tendency to exaggerate the dangers of Communist subversion. If the Communist challenge was overblown, the power of Islamic mobilization was not. And this, in turn, confronted French colonial authorities with a dilemma, born of the fact that imperialist doctrine asserted France's unique sensitivity to the patchwork of Islamic observance, Sufi religious orders, and tribal custom in North and West Africa. But official efforts to classify Muslim social groups were distorted by specious racialist theory and misinterpretation of Islamic customs and social status. The fact remained that, in North Africa especially, Muslim civil society proved both resilient and resistant in the face of creeping European colonialism. As George Joffé has argued, "the urban elite tended to accept colonial control to the extent that traditional Islamic political structures were retained, and to condemn it insofar as they were not.”

For every Muslim official or cleric willing to acknowledge French authority in Algeria as in other Muslim territories, the silent Muslim majority remained hostile to French infractions against sacred spaces, Muslim religious observance, and Islamic juridical authority. In these circumstances, the impenetrability of Islamic society fostered the proliferation of intelligence agencies and security surveillance.

Chapters 4 and 5 analyze the performance of British and French imperial security agencies confronted with violent unrest and communal rebellion. Chapter 4 focuses on early challenges to British imperial authority in Arab territories in the years immediately following World War I. The effectiveness and growing influence of Britain’s colonial police and military intelligence agencies in central administration is examined in connection with a series of revolts immediately after the war ended. The role of intelligence information is considered in the following case studies: urban protest and the 1919 Zaghloul revolt in Egypt; the long-running unrest in Iraqi Kurdistan; the rebellion across Shi’ite Iraq in 1920; and the disorders in 1920s Sudan that produced fundamental change in the administrative structure of the territory. In Egypt and the Sudan, security responses to nationalist disorder placed the intelligence services at the heart of imperial power. So, too, in the Iraq mandate, where communal dissent was especially bitter and containment of Kurdish revolt was an intractable problem. In practice, the security agency intelligence network and the paramilitary police force deployed in northern Iraq were all that prevented Kurdish secession. In northern and southern Iraq, increasing use of air power to coerce dissenting tribes was no substitute for local policing. But state reliance on ethnically recruited irregular forces stored up communal hatreds that spilled over into recurrent violence between Kurds, Assyrians, and Arabs.

The fifth chapter is a partner to the fourth. It holds a mirror to the activity of the British security agencies by considering the operations of their French counterparts in Morocco and Syria. Outside the confines of the major urban centers of both territories, the constitutional prerogatives of French imperial rule were disputed among differing ethnic communities, tribal clans, and religious groups. The chapter investigates the role of French security agencies first in containing rebellion, and then in limiting dissent in two regions: the Moroccan Rif and the Syrian Jabal Druze. The picture that emerges is that the policing of rebellion in the 1920s catalyzed the development of imperial intelligence states throughout the Arab world.

Chapter 6 compares another aspect of Franco-British security service activity—the policing of itinerant Bedouin populations in the southern deserts of Syria, Iraq, and Transjordan. Long colonial frontiers, many of them arbitrarily laid down in defiance of local topography or ethnic distribution, were impossible to police thoroughly. Efforts to improve the effectiveness of state control over the movement of colonial people and goods thus became inseparable from the process of acquiring information about the nature of the environment through which this human and commercial traffic passed. Intelligence frontiers broadly corresponded to the frontiers of settlement, but in territories with large nomadic populations, effective government required an information stream from these nonsedentary populations in the desert interior. Detailed knowledge about viable overland communications routes, navigable waterways, reliable sources of water and grazing, meteorological and epidemiological data, and, most important, the economic connections among differing communities, offered the best guide to where, when, and how colonial subjects were likely to migrate in search of income. The chapter addresses the causes and consequences of tribal control policies, usually implemented by security agency personnel. It uses the example of Bedouin populations to draw out the similarities of French and British practice. Each followed established Ottoman precedent in encouraging the sedentarization of nomadic tribes. Sedentarization was accompanied by increased restrictions on nomadic freedom of movement. The chapter argues that this attempt to “domesticate” migratory tribes amounted to an attack on the very fabric of their culture.
Although intelligence personnel and imperial policing agencies were fundamental to the imposition of central government authority in the countryside, their role in developing strategies of urban policing is better known. Chapter 7 delves deeper into the operational aspects of security surveillance and intelligence gathering in urban settings throughout France’s Arab territories during the interwar years. It examines the day-to-day work of the French security agencies—the Service de Renseignements military intelligence service and the policemen of the Sûreté Générale—reviewing their methods, and their effectiveness as seen by central administration. Intelligence gathering and imperial policing are examined through various case studies of urban disorder in French North Africa and the Levant mandates. This chapter investigates security service work in “the Arab street” of the interwar period, linking urban policing to colonial urbanism as facets of social control. It devotes particular attention to three aspects of security agency work: the legal proscription of nationalist groups and the confinement of their leaders; the infiltration of nationalist meetings and the uses made of the intelligence thus accumulated; and, finally, the politicization of the security agencies in response to the growing radicalism of Arab nationalism.

The interplay between repression of nationalist protest and the accretion of intelligence power in colonial states is further examined in chapter 8. Here the focus spans the entire interwar period, linking the growth of organized Arab protest in the Palestine mandate to the widening role of security agencies in imperial policing during the 1930s. This chapter is a study in misperception and failure; the mistaken assumptions made about the security of mandatory control, the exposure of chronic weakness in the British system of intelligence gathering, and the failure of security strategies based on a “minimum force” doctrine of imperial policing.

In chapter 9 we turn our attention to the late 1930s. Scholars of decolonization wrestle with the theoretical problems inherent in any concept of a transfer of power from a colonial state to a postcolonial nation. The idea of any such transfer as an orderly, finite process, or the symbolic relinquishment of authority by agreed stages has long been discredited. Nevertheless, colonial historians must address the questions of when, where, why, and how imperial authority broke down. This chapter relates these problems to intelligence gathering and colonial policing in the Arab territories on the eve of the Second World War.

This chapter suggests that intelligence assessment and surveillance of subject populations were often collaborative ventures between the local authorities and trusted indigenous intermediaries. It investigates a specific period—1935 to 1939. The reasons for this are threefold. First is the coincidence of two quite separate but equally significant events for the French and British security agencies in the summer of 1936: the election of the Socialist-led Popular Front coalition in France, and the outbreak of the Arab revolt in Palestine. The promise of Popular Front colonial reform transformed the nature of social protest and intelligence gathering in French Arab territories. And the Palestine revolt, which is analyzed in chapter 8, hastened the development of a shared sense of Arab identity in opposition to European rule. A second reason for the specific chronological focus is that official efforts accelerated in 1936 to renegotiate the terms of the French and British imperial presence in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Palestine. This shift in policy affected every facet of security agency activity in the territories concerned. The third justification for the focus on 1936 to 1939 is the conjunction of the growing threat of world war and attempts by the security agencies to consolidate working relationships with trusted local subordinates in order to maintain order at minimal cost. These policy shifts are examined in the context of a limited “transfer of power,” ultimately frustrated as the likelihood of war increased.

The conclusion ties together the discussions of the preceding chapters by addressing the book's central theme of colonial states as intelligence states. It revisits the nature of the security agencies established in North Africa and the Middle East after the First World War, and retraces their increasing administrative role as the challenges of interethnic violence, communal rebellion, and organized nationalist protest undermined the stability of imperial systems throughout the interwar Arab world. A further theme revisited in the conclusion is the security agencies’ increasing preoccupation with the penetration of imperial authority in rural society. Bringing the growing challenges of organized urban opposition and rural disorder together, the conclusion focuses once again on the main currents in the discourse of security service reportage and policy advice, tying these to the concept of the intelligence state that underpins the book as a whole. We are thus brought full circle to the issues raised in this introduction. Just as covert intelligence was for many years a “missing dimension” of international history, so, too, its importance in colonial history is only gradually emerging. Intelligence and empire were inextricably linked in a symbiotic relationship, the growth of one nourishing the consolidation of the other.
INTRODUCTION


8. Newbury, Patrons, Clients, and Empire, 257.


21. The concept of “warning failure” is usually discussed in relation to a state’s failure to anticipate or act on an imminent threat of external attack. The inherent difficulties in providing a comprehensive warning system are of relevance here, however; see Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics 31, no. 1 (1978): 61–89.


25. Jock Mc Culloch, “Empire and Violence, 1900–1939,” in Gender and Empire,


27. For a discussion of political reaction to the killings, see Derek Sayer, "British Reaction to the Amritsar Massacre, 1919–1920," Past and Present 131 (1991): 139–64; Boyce, "From Assaye to the Assaye," 655–68.


30. Richard Roberts and Kristin Mann, eds., Law in Colonial Africa (Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 1991), 5–35. As Roberts and Mann note in their opening remarks, "laws and courts, police and prisons formed essential elements in European efforts to establish and maintain political domination. ... Colonialism sought to impose a new moral as well as political and economic order, founded on loyalty to metropolitan and colonial states and on discipline, order, and regularity in work, leisure, and bodily habits."


32. Ibid., 67–69.


36. Jackson, Quasi-States, 21–25, 69–71. Jackson's perceptve comments about the consequences of what he terms "negative sovereignty" in postcolonial black Africa draw on his reading of the effects of late colonialism on state structures in the developing world.


CHAPTER 1


2. For instance, Britain's internal security service, MI5, grew from fourteen staff members in 1914 to nearly 850 by 1919. By 1925, its permanent staff had been cut back to twenty-five. See Edward Higgs, The Information State in England: The Central Collection of Information on Citizens since 1900 (London: Palgrave, 2004), 144–45.

powers using Spanish territory as an assembly point for attacks on the Maghreb.\textsuperscript{167} In a worst-case scenario, Spanish forces might traverse the Rif highlands to sever the arterial rail and road connections between Rabat and Tunis, thus impeding any reinforcement of Tunisia’s eastern frontier and leaving it prone to attack from neighboring Italian Libya.\textsuperscript{168}

The possibility of unrestricted Italian submarine warfare and large-scale aerial bombardments in the western Mediterranean basin also raised the specter of severed communications among France’s southern ports, North Africa, and Lebanon. This was alarming. Essential colonial troop reinforcement to France in the first stages of war would be disrupted. Colonial supremacy in the Maghreb might be undermined. With more than 90 percent of its fuel oil and petroleum stores located in the two ports of Toulon and Bizerta, the French Mediterranean fleet might find its operational capacity diminished.\textsuperscript{169} It fell to the French Navy’s string of sight monitoring stations from Bizerta to Oran to counteract this danger of Italian attack by alerting the Ministry of Marine’s intelligence section to any hostile shipping movements.\textsuperscript{170} In December 1937, Admiral Jean-François Darlan’s naval staff and its air force counterpart warned the government’s national defense committee that the army’s concentration on protection of the Rhine frontier should not be permitted to leave France’s Arab territories ill-prepared for any attack.\textsuperscript{171}

Improved transmission, assessment, and exploitation of incoming intelligence were certainly needed in the changing strategic circumstances of the Mediterranean theater. An effective intelligence cycle was critical to French colonial security, minimizing any possibility of surprise attack and consequent internal unrest. If external menaces to French imperial control in the Maghreb increased in the two years before war broke out, public expressions of internal opposition to colonial control were much diminished. By the summer of 1938, most of the prominent nationalist leaders, trade union organizers, Muslim ‘ulama, and Communist activists across France’s three North African territories were targets of an imperial crackdown that continued unabated until the fall of France two years later. Other more compliant political figures, such as the Federation of Elected Muslims, abandoned their earlier dalliance with more militant protest and mass resignation, preferring to work within the confines of the colonial system rather than face proscription or arrest.\textsuperscript{172} By the time the war began, the security services in France’s Muslim territories defined how the colonial state would respond to the challenge of organized nationalism. If the outbreak of World War II signaled the end of the intelligence state in Britain’s Arab territories, in the neighboring French territories 1939–40 marked the transition to the more intensive surveillance and expanded police powers characteristic of the Vichy years.

CONCLUSION

Intelligence, Security, and the Colonial State

The fundamental dilemma confronting the victor powers after World War I was how to sustain order in the new international system. The fundamental dilemma of empires in the same period was how to achieve order in colonial systems where the scope to use local institutions packed with “reliable” local clients as mechanisms of political control was constrained by the countervailing reluctance to concede meaningful political authority to indigenous populations.\textsuperscript{1} The two problems were interlinked. The extension of British and French imperial hegemony throughout most of the Arab world after 1919 was a direct consequence of the outcome of the war.\textsuperscript{2} And the intensification of international crises over the course of the next twenty years bore directly on the capacity of these imperial powers to keep their empires intact in the face of mounting internal opposition.\textsuperscript{3}

Fear of dissent therefore preoccupied European officials in the Muslim states stretching from the southern littoral of the Mediterranean to the Middle Eastern mandates forged in the deal making of the First World War. European authority over indigenous populations was variously disputed: by traditional elites displaced from positions of influence; by educated émigrés denied opportunities for economic advancement within the colonial order; by tribal confederations that spurned the physical and cultural boundaries of European rule; by urban workers increasingly drawn to organized unionism; and by a rural peasantry struggling to maintain customary forms of land tenure in the face of foreign settlement and harsh interwar economic conditions. Moreover, fear of dissent was constructed in new ways. As Ann Stoler has shown in the context of the interwar Dutch East Indies, instances of indigenous violence against Europeans were increasingly read as indicators of impending social breakdown and malevolent external influence.\textsuperscript{4} In these circumstances, some means had to be found to close or at least narrow
the gaps between the ruling power and all strata of indigenous society. The result was the "information order"—a combination of intelligence provision, threat assessment, and state efforts to control social communication in colonial society. Seen in this light, the French and British imperial administrations were a vast security apparatus. Central government depended on incoming information to maintain order in the towns, cities, and rural interior of overseas territories.

As the web of European imperial rule spread further after the First World War, security agencies acquired additional importance. Theoretically, a pulsating intelligence information relayed from the periphery of this web to its administrative center enabled colonial governments, garrison commanders, and police inspectors to deploy limited resources to maximum effect at minimum cost. In practice, the imperial security system was woefully overstretched and often outflanked, as evidenced by the proliferation of parties, associations, unions, and religious foundations variously opposed to European rule. As a result, the information order repeatedly broke down, with serious consequences. Troops taking to the streets or the hills in aid of the civil power generally indicated that the mechanisms of the intelligence state had failed. Such intelligence failure was usually the product of one of two causes: either the intelligence-gathering system proved inadequate and therefore unable to anticipate the probable scale of unrest, as in Egypt and Iraq in 1919–20 and Palestine in 1926, or the intelligence gatherers had overreached, overconfident of their power to control events, as in southern Kurdistan in 1919–21, in Syria’s Jabal Druze in 1925–29, and in the Moroccan Rif prior to the outbreak of war with Abd el-Krim. In these last three cases, native affairs officers had tried to manipulate tribal loyalties only to find their efforts thwarted as the subjects of their attention—Kurdish clans, Druze chiefs, and Rif Berbers—reacted violently against such presumptuous intrusion.

What do these examples tell us? Above all, they suggest that political policing and intelligence gathering were driven by a recognition of the limits of colonial state power in societies governed through systems of uneasy clientage and elite cooperation. This point may also be put rather differently: the colonial environment in which the British and French security services operated was, in and of itself, the principal barrier to their success. Consider for a moment the primary determinants of intelligence activity. For one thing, until at least 1956, within the imperial territories studied here, the greatest threats to state security were internally, not externally, generated. To argue that direct challenges to the colonial state determined interwar intelligence gathering and security force deployment in the Arab world is too reductive, however. Three additional considerations must also be borne in mind: the level of European settlement, the scale of local economic activity, and the anticipated likelihood of intercommunal clashes. One or more of these factors typically weighed heavily in decisions about target identification and resource allocation.

The growth of settler power in interwar Algeria had profound economic, cultural, and political consequences for the long-term stability of colonial control. In mandate Palestine, Jewish immigration and British land law wrought equally fundamental changes in the socioeconomic fabric of Arab society. In other territories, what were thought to be stable client-patron relationships between peasant farmers and urban notables, many of them absentee landlords, turned out to be volatile. The rise of Wahhabism in the mid-1920s, the erosion of nomadic lifestyles, and discontent among tribesmen facing economic impoverishment at the margin of the capitalist cash economy in Arab states all contributed to profound social change among rural populations.

After World War I, conflicts over access to agricultural land, whether for settlement, arable cultivation, or pasturage, occasioned more security force intervention than anything else in the rural interior of Middle Eastern and North African territories. Police commanders were also well aware that crime rates among the indigenous population, property theft especially, were closely linked to levels of agricultural employment, scarcity of food, and resentment at loss of land or traditional grazing grounds. Explanations of the dominant agricultural concerns among the local community featured prominently in the politics of village councils and tribal assemblies as reported by native affairs officers from Morocco to Iraq. Imperial security services were expected to know about such matters, to anticipate them, and take police them. A further imperative was the control of urban public space. This was understood in terms of regulating freedom of movement, enforcing varying degrees of racial segregation between areas of European and indigenous settlement, and controlling housing policy and commercial zoning in a period of unprecedented urban growth. Such control had a dynamic of its own—the more regulation imposed, the greater the obligation to enforce it.

Another recurrent theme of this book has been that colonial states relied on intelligence gathering to survive. This is not to suggest that intelligence analysis was synonymous with policymaking, an altogether too one-dimensional approach. Nor can colonial intelligence assessment be regarded instrumentally as a form of power. But it is to suggest that a more catholic vision of the parameters and purpose of state intelligence gathering may aid our understanding of how colonial states endured. State surveillance is a likely, if not inevitable, consequence, of complex societal organization. As we have seen, it was an established feature of British and French society in the interwar period. Cast in this light, state surveillance may serve the people as well as controlling them. The relative importance of these two functions varies between societies. At one extreme, recent
work on early Soviet surveillance techniques of population classification—by class, by ethnicity, by profession, or more generally as loyal or untrustworthy citizens—draws out the coercive potential of administrative technologies of surveillance such as passports, identity cards, and tax codes. At the other end of the spectrum, more in tune with Max Weber’s theories of state development, record keeping about a subject population tends not to be seen as threatening, but as pivotal to the efficient promotion of the collective good. It is useful here to consider what one discerning intelligence scholar has identified as the four primary obstacles to the effective exploitation of intelligence: “time and space, organization, politicization, and cognition.” Let us take these categories in turn.

Time and, more particularly, space—in other words, geographical distance—were critical in large colonial territories characterized by rudimentary infrastructure and minimal development of electronic communication. Comprehensive information collection and rapid, astute intelligence assessment were integral to the effective deployment of the coercive instruments of colonial power: police units, military formations, or aircraft squadrons. The acquisition, transmission, analysis, and dissemination of sensitive intelligence had to outstrip the speed with which the subject at hand could develop into a more severe threat to colonial security. Put crudely, the troops had to be on the streets before anticipated protests escalated into general disorder. When they were not—as in Palestine following the Wailing Wall riots of August 1929—imperial authority came perilously close to collapse.

Intelligence activities were not only designed to fill the gaps left by the limited strength of colonial armed forces. They were more multifaceted than this. Here we encounter the second potential obstacle to success: organization, or rather, organizational deficiency. The bureaucracy of colonial state security was expected to feed sensitive information to policymakers and the enforcers of colonial power. Its organizational structure needed to be sufficiently simple to prevent information getting lost in a bureaucratic tangle, but sufficiently sophisticated for intelligence analysis to filter out the critical intelligence from the background “noise” of workaday information. Colonial security services were therefore organized to furnish sufficient intelligence about local social organization to enable government to function. This sphere of intelligence activity ranged from police operations, threat assessments, criminal profiling, and infiltration of proto nationalist groups to ostensibly innocuous data collection such as topographical surveys, taxation assessments, census returns, and anthropological studies of tribal and clan affiliations.

Intelligence gatherers and intelligence analysts were also intelligence disseminators. This brings us to the third obstacle to intelligence effectiveness: politicization. Dissemination of information, and state action in response to it, completed an intelligence cycle that began with acquisition, reportage, and evaluation. The evaluation, dissemination, and action phases of this process were all points at which intelligence and policy intersected.

At every stage of the intelligence cycle, threat assessment was inherently politicized by the dominant ideology of imperialism with its coded hierarchies of racial difference, gender discrimination, and European supremacy. The identification of whom or what constituted a danger to the colonial state stigmatized certain individuals, political parties, tribes, religious communities, and even entire ethnic groups. The lines separating evaluation of threats from cultural prejudice and racial stereotyping were blurred as deep-rooted assumptions about indigenous communities and their likely behavior informed intelligence analysis. Intelligence officers, senior officials, and colonial governors often shared similar attitudes, creating a further problem of mutual reinforcement of prevailing views. Here we encounter the question of cognition—the fourth and final obstacle to effective intelligence exploitation. Colonial states sought information about the entire dependent population. But those that provided it had to prioritize among groups to make their work manageable. Allocation of resources to intelligence targets reflected their underlying assumptions about where potential dangers lay. These assumptions, in turn, reflected their understanding—or cognition—of the society in which they operated.

At one level, this is merely to state the obvious. Social actors use their understanding of a local environment to decide on appropriate courses of action. At another level, however, cognition could present difficulties if it meant that intelligence collection and assessment were devoted to gathering information that merely reaffirmed the preexisting ideas of those in charge. Put another way, cognition manifested itself as an obstacle to effective intelligence assessment when the colonial state’s information-providers could not digest information that ran counter to their fundamental operating assumptions. Trapped by their cultural outlook, in such circumstances intelligence analysts simply told their political masters what they expected—or wanted—to hear. The point should not be overstressed. In most of the colonial settings studied here, intelligence communities tried to remain dispassionate and analytical. Their assessment of individuals, groups, and events nonetheless remained that of a colonial elite governing a racially ordered society.

Problems of cultural bias influenced source selection, threat rankings, and policy predictions. Intelligence warnings about dangers to colonial order were contingent; in other words, the problems foreseen were not considered inevitable. Rather, the estimated likelihood of dissent reflected the received wisdom, the past experience, and the dominant attitudes of the intelligence communities that supplied information to colonial govern-
ment. All this boiled down to cognition. Taken together, problems of politicization and cognition crept into colonial intelligence assessment less in the form of overt political direction from government intelligence "consumers" to the security service intelligence "producers" than in the mutual reinforcement of their attitudes as colonizers toward the dependent peoples under their charge.

All this reminds us that intelligence gathering was one thing, the formulation and implementation of effective security policy quite another. The bureaucratic structures, community affiliations, and cultural markings of colonial intelligence gathering reveal some things to the historian, but not others. Even high-quality intelligence made available quickly could not prevent the growth of indigenous opposition. This, however, was not its primary purpose. Security policy was more about containment than prevention. It was a compensatory strategy designed to overcome the inability of colonial states to impose their authority either by coercion or consent. Unable and unwilling to rule imperial territories as police states, the preferred alternative of French and British administrators across North Africa and the Middle East was what I have referred to here as the intelligence state.

From Morocco to Iraq, these intelligence states were not quite the domain of spies, uniformed officers, and huge secret police forces that the name may imply. Security service work was only rarely sensational. More often it was predictable, methodical, even tedious: more office work and record keeping than cloak and dagger. Committee meetings and laborious collation of personnel files and statistical data took up more time than face-to-face contacts between local informants and secret service operatives. Office-based analysis of long-term socioeconomic trends and short-term threats to the colonial order consumed far more resources than agent surveillance of dissidents.

There were, of course, important variations between territories, and between urban and rural intelligence gathering in individual states. Take Iraq as an example. Before and after the end of the Iraq mandate, government security forces devoted more resources to the suppression of tribal or separatist disorder than to the containment of nationalist opposition. But the frequency of disorder and the deployment of troops was not necessarily a reliable guide to the severity of the threat posed to government. Tribal rebellion might continue for years without endangering central administration. A few days of mass protest in the major towns and cities of Iraq might unseat the entire regime. It was therefore vital to balance intelligence gathering in the mainly outlying locations of tribal or separatist unrest against the far greater menace of organized urban political protest that might strike at the heart of the state apparatus.29

Iraq was not alone in this respect. The rise of organized nationalism in interwar empires was mirrored in intelligence reportage by the security services in North Africa and the Middle East. Yet it is striking that other issues entirely dominated the bulk of intelligence reports from both regions. Administrative intelligence and environmental intelligence consumed far more ink than political discussion of nationalist groups. Intelligence communities in the Middle East mandates and Sudan attached as much importance to tribal movements, cross-border incursions, and livestock raiding as to the predominantly urban phenomena of party politics and nationalist protest. Throughout the 1920s, field intelligence, mainly derived from humint, often focused on tribal politics, agricultural conditions, and economic resources. Such information collection sometimes contrasted with central government preoccupation with wider issues of geopolitics and economies of scale in imperial administration. As its designation implies, human intelligence told a story about politics from below, whereas ministers and senior departmental advisers in Paris and London tended to discuss political change from above.

This is not to suggest that security agencies had no role in high politics; quite the reverse. In each of the territories studied here, the military personnel and police officers that dominated security agency work made up a cohesive imperial "intelligence community." Its members were united in the belief that their jurisdictional and operational boundaries should be as wide as possible. Imperial governments tried to exert influence over indigenous political elites, usually by linking enfranchisement and access to subordinate office with naturalization, educational qualifications, and/or economic resources. Just as important as this political imperative was its economic equivalent: the regulation of the colonial economy by ordering metropolitan needs above the demands of local consumption. In each field, intelligence gathering, surveillance of dissent, and monitoring of local economic conditions were essential components of administrative decision making.

To play devil's advocate a moment, surely this characterization exaggerates the importance of intelligence to colonial government. Why should we regard essentially political reportage—governors' reports, district commissioners' correspondence, administrative surveys of prevailing conditions—as something more, as security intelligence pivotal to the survival of the colonial state? The reason is simple and fundamental: its predictive value. It was the nature of colonial rule (specifically, its denial of democratic inclusion) that made even low-level political appreciations a matter of colonial state security. Colonial power was grounded in racial dominance. The host of justifications advanced in defense of Western rule—from promises of economic modernization, to control of intercommunal conflict, to more efficient central administration—could never disguise this. After the unprecedented trials of World War I, imperial governments were acutely conscious that the alienation of dependent populations from a political system that systematically excluded them was, at best, a strong possibility, and at worst, only a matter of
in colonial student associations and other coordinating bodies eager to unite differing nationalist groups in opposition to European dominance. Surely this was proof that anticolonialism was as much the product of outside interference as it was of colonial misrule. How comforting it was to attribute mounting public hostility toward imperial policy to external subversion rather than to concede that imperial rule was locally detested!

Organized anticolonialism in Arab territories was thus conflated with external threats to empire. Hence the widespread tendency to exaggerate the role of the Comintern, of covert German funding for nationalist organization, and of pan-Arabist coordination of local nationalist protest. Here again we confront the underlying issue: lack of consensual authority in a colonial setting. Colonial authorities meshed local opposition with external dangers because state repression presented opportunities for foreign opponents to exploit the inevitable discontent of subject populations. Confronted with intractable opposition and a mass of colonial subjects denied meaningful political rights, imperial administration was hamstrung by another characteristic of colonial rule: shortage of state funds.

Colonial government on a shoestring was nothing new. Nor was it likely to change. It had long been a principle of British and French imperialism that dependent states should pay their own way—what in France was known for centuries as “the colonial compact.” Although this basic rule was frequently relaxed, colonial economies and the fiscal revenue generated from colonial taxpayers were expected to support the costs of imperial government, including expenditure on policing and internal security. Here, too, there were recurrent problems. After 1919, and still more so in the Depression years of the early 1930s, most colonial governments taxed their subject populations heavily. But the monetary resources of the taxable population in most colonial territories were too limited to fund extensive government spending. Taxes levied in kind, typically on agricultural produce and livestock, brought in additional monies once these goods were sold. Such sales did not alter the fact that few colonial governments were entirely self-supporting. Time after time in the interwar years colonial governors the length and breadth of Africa and the Middle East went cap in hand to their metropolitan Treasury for stopgap funding. The financial boundaries between colony and mother country became more nebulous as a consequence. This was particularly evident both in matters of internal policing, theoretically paid for locally, and external defense, whose costs were shared by colonial and metropolitan governments.

The salient point here is that the revenue base of colonial states was severely limited in the testing economic conditions that prevailed for a good portion of the interwar period. There was little capacity for internal spending to ameliorate social conditions, regardless of whether the political will to make such investment existed. Short of funds for internal economic
posed a similar dilemma, and one typified by arguments within government and outside it over the feasibility of sending a battle ship fleet to defend the Malayan barrier and the Singapore naval base. The prospect of simultaneous engagement against Germany, Italy, and Japan created insolvable strategic dilemmas for French and British imperial defense planners. By contrast, the preservation of colonial state control in the face of mounting internal opposition as war drew nearer presented challenges that seemed both more familiar and more manageable.

It would, therefore, be wrong to see the heightened interest in empire security after 1936 as a radical departure from the preceding fifteen years of colonial intelligence gathering. More widespread civil strife in Arab territories in the immediate prewar years caused an intensification of security service activity, rather than a major reconfiguration of its fundamental tenets. Obsession with German and, to a lesser extent, Italian support for anti-Western Muslim sedition had never entirely gone away after 1918. Contacts between pan-Islamist, pan-Arab, and nationalist groups and all manner of foreign governments were always obvious surveillance targets. By 1935, the primacy of local intelligence gathering focused on nationalist and other internal dissent was coming to an end. Britain’s security agencies from Sudan to Iraq devoted much greater attention to monitoring contacts between their domestic opponents and foreign governments hostile to the Western powers. Covert intelligence gathering also shifted toward discovery and containment of Axis activity in the Muslim world, a transition mirrored in the Levant SR. These were not abrupt changes; they were prefigured years earlier.

It makes no sense to view the extent of intelligence gathering in colonial states as a corruption of their declared purpose to enhance the power of imperialist nations and introduce Western norms to the government of dependent societies. Rather, intelligence and empire were codependent. The central contention of this book has been that the North African and Middle Eastern territories studied here shared a fundamental characteristic: at root, they were intelligence states—shaped by the process of information gathering about the populations they claimed to control.

In the French case, the primary catalyst for worsening civil unrest in its overseas empire was the state repression attendant on the abandonment of Popular Front reforms in 1937–38. Just as nationalist parties, trade unions, and religious associations had tried to capitalize on the Popular Front’s readiness to contemplate colonial reform, so they were first in line when Daladier’s government, with strong support from the Senate and the colonial service, threw the reform process into reverse. The arrest of troublesome colonial leaders, the renewal of bans on union strike actions and collective bargaining, and the Sûreté sweeps against suspected Communist cells marked a reversion to “normal” interwar colonial conditions. It was the freer political atmosphere that the Popular Front had tried to create that was extraordinary. In French North Africa and Indochina, the coercive containment of colonial nationalism in 1938–40 fit a longer-term pattern of state surveillance and legal restriction altered only fleetingly in 1936–37.

The French general staff’s attempt to integrate the defense of empire into planning for war against Germany in Europe inevitably subordinated the colonies’ strategic requirements to those of mainland France. In consequence, there were precious few resources that could be spared for overseas territories after the protection of France’s borders was taken into account. For Britain, the defense of its Asian possessions against Japanese attack
CONCLUSION


8. See, for example, CAOM, GGA, 11IV6, Algiers Direction des affaires indigenes, "Rapport mensuel sur la situation politique des indigenes, juillet 1918." The report noted that the success of the 1918 tax collection depended on the quality of that year's harvest.


11. Hence, in Lebanon and Syria, where cinemas provided a convenient meeting point for political groups and an obvious forum in which to subvert the supremacy of French culture generally portrayed on screen, the police spéciad kept a close watch on audience behavior. The censors determined what films and newsreel footage could be shown, but the secret police still found it necessary to monitor audience reaction; see Elizabeth Thompson, Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 200-201.


15. Peter Jackson, "Historical Reflections on the Uses and Limits of Intelligence," in Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society, ed. Peter Jackson and Jennifer Siegel (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2005), 13.

16. Ibid., 14.

17. Ibid., 15.

18. Ibid., 17-18.


20. TNA, FO 406/72, E1422/1170/93; Sir Francis Humphrys to Sir John Simon, 22 February 1934.

21. Ibid.

22. SHA, Moscow, G223/D122, SEA report, "Note sur les conditions psychologiques d'une mobilisation generale en Algerie (Mat 1935)."


26. For example, the correspondence on Britain's strategic position in the Middle East in TNA, WO 106/2018A, Notes on tour of Egypt and Palestine by CIGS, January-February 1939; WO 201/252, Sudan: General defense questions, 1937-
27. See, for example, SHA, Moscow, C609/D374, SCR summary report, “Activités communistes en territoires sous mandat français,” 12 April 1939.


30. See, for example, TNA, AIR 20/678, “Intelligence organization,” 26 March 1936, and “Notes on the Intelligence Organization in the Sudan,” n.d. [1936].


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